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Abstract: This article explores a key debate within the British Army of the 
power of the regimental system over the structure of the army. It will do so by 
focusing on the discussions undertaken between 1927 and 1931 on the issue of 
allocating vacancies to the two Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta. It will 
demonstrate that the regimental system of the British Army was so ingrained as 
to effect the reform of a structure that had stood outside the scope of regimental 
influence since its formalization in 1905. In doing so, it will be argued that the 
existence of the attitudes created by the regimental system in senior British offi-
cers had a significant impact on the British Army’s ability to recognize the need 
for the reform of Staff College entry process despite the increased importance 
and technicalization of staff duties as a result of the First World War.
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In the interwar period, the British Army faced a series of circumstances that would test its ability to adapt, reform, and develop, while simultaneously maintaining its commitment to an increased number of manpower- intensive 
deployments across the empire. Historians have long discussed how these in-
creased territorial responsibilities—combined with revulsion at the casualties 
suffered during the First World War and the desire of ordinary soldiers to be de-
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mobilized—contributed to a significant weakening of the British Army in this 
period.1 Furthermore, much has been made of the fact that while other Europe-
an nations maintained large standing armies through a system of compulsion, 
Britain rapidly reverted to its prewar roots in the form of a small, professional 
army, backed up by a reserve of volunteer units.2 In this context, the efficient use 
of manpower, particularly the limited peacetime supply of officers, was crucial 
to ensuring that the British Army was able to meet its many commitments in 
the interwar period. While some recent scholarship acknowledges the failure of 
the British Army to make the best use of its resources in general terms, the nar-
ratives have focused principally on the initial allocation of personnel to arms of 
service.3 This article will argue that the failure to manage manpower resources, 
arguably a relatively new phenomenon in the technologically dominated bat-
tlefields of the post-1918 world, was also a problem for that part of the British 
Army generally referred to as “the brain of the army”—the staff. 
At a time of disarmament and social disquiet over the perceived aggressive 
nature of the British Army, when young men were deterred from an army ca-
reer due to slow promotion and a lack of opportunity to learn skills useful in 
civilian employment, the British Army failed to move away from the historical 
conservative dogma of the officer corps. As a result, despite evidence that sup-
ported open competition to the staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta and the 
subsequent increase in technical corps officers obtaining vacancies, the Army 
Council continued to put its faith in the traditional arms and restricted entry 
of those officers who could have improved the quality of the staff through their 
appreciation and understanding of modern methods of war.
The importance of issues relating to staff training through the interwar 
army should not be underestimated. While the Haldane reforms of the early 
twentieth century had established the principles of the general staff and resulted 
in the creation of Field Service Regulations, it must be remembered that through-
out the period discussed in this article, the British Army and regimental com-
manders in particular remained suspicious of officers who wished to apply to 
Staff College.4 Indeed, even into the later years of the interwar period, regiments 
boasted that none of their officers had been encouraged to apply.5 In addition to 
this, the majority of deployments and engagements undertaken by the British 
Army in this period were relatively small in scale.6 In many cases, troop concen-
trations did not exceed a reinforced battalion and, as a result, no formal staff 
was required (the lowest level at which an organized staff was required was the 
brigade). Thus, any staff work was undertaken by regimental officers assigned 
staff responsibilities in addition to their normal regimental duties. For example, 
while Palestine, Ireland, and Burma represented significant drains on imperial 
manpower in the 1920s and early 1930s, operations largely consisted of small 
motorized flying columns or platoon patrols to maintain discipline and order 
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or to undertake surgical strikes against key hostile leaders.7 As a result, for many 
officers in the British and Indian armies, their first experience of staff training 
was based not on the centralized training made available at Staff College but on 
the administrative training provided by their regimental commanders.8 In this 
context, the centralized staff training provided at Staff College was, in practice, 
unexploited. However, in the wider context of the period in which the British 
Army found itself scrapping with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to 
define a role for itself in imperial defense planning, such centralized training 
was of prime importance. It was only by ensuring that the British Army had 
a modern, efficient planning staff in place that it could be sure of setting out 
realistic plans to “suit the special requirements of any particular campaign and 
of rapid expansion to meet the case of a grave emergency.”9 While its organiza-
tional doctrine emphasized flexibility of approach, as an addendum to this, its 
operational doctrine emphasized that “the instructions laid down herein cover 
a war of the first magnitude, but can be modified in their application to other 
forms of warfare.”10 Thus, while still emphasizing the importance of flexibility 
in the context of imperial defense and low-intensity warfare, Field Service Reg-
ulations also recognized the possibility of the British Army needing to deploy 
in greatly expanded form to meet an organized, well-equipped enemy. As will 
be demonstrated below, with the imposition of a quota system for competitive 
vacancies to Staff College, the Army Council effectively impeded its own ability 
to create flexible and coordinated defense plans, in favor of a commitment to 
regimental soldiering.
Background to the Quota System
The quota system for allocating vacancies to the staff colleges came about as the 
result of wider problems surrounding the recruitment of officers for the army. 
This problem would plague the British Army throughout the interwar period 
and would plant its roots firmly in the changed social and political attitudes to-
ward the army as a result of the experiences of the First World War and the early 
years of the interwar period. Of particular consequence for the British Army 
was the growing belief, “particularly in the upper and educated classes . . . that 
little separated the lot of the victors from that of the defeated.”11 The growing 
distaste for war that these feelings engendered was particularly damaging for the 
British officer corps as it was these two groups, the upper classes in particular, 
who continued to supply the bulk of candidates for commissions. Antimilitary 
attitudes were strengthened with the formation of the League of Nations and 
led to the erroneous belief that military action on the scale of the First World 
War was a thing of the past and that “all international conflicts were amenable 
to negotiation and discussion.”12 As a result, the general political mood toward 
disarmament and the rapid reductions in British Army strength in the early 
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part of the interwar period were praised and supported by the sections of the 
population most needed to fill positions of leadership. 
In addition to this general desire for disarmament, the army retained its 
public perception as being an aggressive force, designed for destructive of-
fensive action, in support of a wealthy, industrial elite, rather than to serve 
as the defensive bastion of the empire and its people. Indeed, the most stark 
example of this was the Amritsar massacre in 1919, in which approximately 
380 unarmed Indian civilians were killed by Ghurkas under the command 
of British Brigadier General Reginald Dyer while attending a political rally.13 
Less deadly, but far more impactful to the civilian population, was the deploy-
ment of 36 battalions called out on emergency duty to aid the police and civil 
authorities during the 1926 General Strike.14 Combined with the significant 
deployment to peacekeeping duties in Ireland, this relatively aggressive use of 
the British Army in this period did much to dissuade a war-weary population 
of the positive benefits of service in the army. Furthermore, the near constant 
reduction in military strength in the years immediately following the end of 
the First World War did little to encourage those wishing to commit to a long-
term career to join the army. Ultimately this came down to two factors, the 
first of which was slow promotion within the regiment. With the abolition of 
purchase, promotion within the individual regiment was governed by senior-
ity. For the corps regiments (Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Signal Corps, 
and the Royal Army Service Corps), each had one list for all the officers with-
in the corps, further reducing the frequency of promotion. The result was a 
blockage of the promotion of junior officers, “taking perhaps twelve or more 
years before a Subaltern could become a Captain.”15 As well as discouraging 
recruitment, it left many junior officers living “in hopes of another war or the 
recurrence of the Black Plague.”16 
In addition to these internal factors, the British Army faced stiff compe-
tition from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for its officer recruits. In 
the interwar period, all three Services were attempting to recruit from the same 
pool of public school–educated young men. Indeed, in a report on the edu-
cation of potential candidates for Royal Air Force commissions, it was noted 
that “this qualification depends upon a certain moral temper as much or as 
more than upon any purely intellectual proficiency. It is often described as the 
quality of a gentleman.”17 Furthermore, as the Royal Air Force and the army 
shared admission papers, with candidates selecting their order of preference, 
these two Services were in direct competition for officer cadets.18 In addition 
to this competition, the civil service commissioners who set the relative pass 
marks required for each college tended to ensure that the most academically 
gifted gained entry to Cranwell by setting the required pass grades at “41% for 
Cranwell, 38% for Woolwich and 36% for Sandhurst.”19 As a result, not only 
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was the army facing a significant public relations problem in its attempts to 
secure suitable candidates for commissions, but the most academically able of 
those seeking to join the Services were being skimmed off by either the Royal 
Navy or the Royal Air Force.
The result was a decline in quality within the officer corps of the British 
Army, which led Major General Sir Hugh J. Elles to note, “We are now unable 
to fill the cadet colleges . . . the quality is not high.”20 This in turn resulted 
in a dip in quality of officers applying for and gaining places at the staff col-
leges. As noted above, while the operational commitments of the army did not 
necessarily require a high-quality staff, the doctrinal requirement for flexibility 
in planning that had been enshrined in Field Service Regulations established a 
crucial precedence for creating such a staff at the War Office to aid operational 
planning for possible conflicts. The ability of the staff in the 1920s to do this 
was called into question by Chief of the Imperial Staff Sir George F. Milne, who 
stated, “It is a positive danger to the Army and a crime to the nation that some 
of the officers are allowed by their commanding officers to be put on the Staff 
College list.”21 In an attempt to improve the quality of officers on the staff as 
well as the attractiveness of the army to those seeking a challenging career, in 
1926, it was proposed to remove the original quota for competitive vacancies 
for places at the staff colleges. Before examining the impact of this change, it is 
worth describing the process of entry to the staff colleges in this period.
Staff College Entry in the Interwar Period
During the interwar period, the principle method of entry to the Staff College 
was via competitive examination, held once a year in February or March in vari-
ous locations across the empire, including London and Delhi. The examination 
was divided into two sections—obligatory and voluntary subjects—with each 
section being designed to test the skills deemed necessary to succeed as a staff 
officer. Those subjects rated as obligatory were: Training for War, Organization 
and Administration, and Imperial Organization.22 These papers were to serve as 
a litmus test for potential staff officers, and they ensured that “the percentage 
of marks allotted to military subjects was eighty per cent [sic].”23 The optional 
subjects included a wide variety of languages, physics, chemistry, political econ-
omy, and the history of British India and thus, while covering a wide array of 
subjects, still retained an element of military knowledge.24 Until 1926, a prewar 
quota system was in force that assigned a specific number of vacancies to each 
arm of Service taking the competitive examination. While in the post–Boer 
War period the curriculum of the college had undergone significant change, 
the allocation of vacancies had not. As a result, the number of vacancies offered 
was broadly the same as that of the late 1880s, namely, “Cavalry and Infantry 
18, Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers 6, Indian Army 3, Royal Marines 1, 
58 A Scientific or Regimental Staff
MCU Journal
Nominations 4.”25 Given the significant changes in warfare during the course of 
the First World War, with the increased focus on field fortifications, the growing 
dominance of artillery and defensive firepower, the subsequent relegation of 
cavalry to a supporting role, and the introduction of aircraft and tanks, such a 
division of vacancies was clearly unsuited to the demands of modern warfare.26 
However, this allocation, heavily favoring the “teeth arms,” traditionally seen 
as comprising the infantry and cavalry, was ideally suited to the demands of an 
army focused on imperial policing and tied to the Cardwell system of linked 
battalions. As a result, while British Army doctrine expressed the need for flex-
ibility, the reality of the situation, including for the provision of staff officers, 
was that “the greater portion of the British Army is regulated by the conditions 
prevailing on a portion of one of the frontiers.”27 
To be eligible for one of the nominated places on offer, they had to have 
achieved the minimum pass mark on the competitive examination as well as 
“(i) Good service in the field. (ii) Three years’ service as Adjutant. (iii) Good 
service on the Staff or as an instructor for two years.”28 These additional con-
ditions aimed at not only ensuring a minimum standard of competency had 
been achieved but also that those who did not qualify high enough in the ex-
amination to gain a competitive place gained practical experience to compen-
sate for this lack of academic standing. While principally serving as a reward 
for those who had already demonstrated their competency in peacetime staff 
roles, nomination had allowed “distinguished field officers to supplement their 
battlefield experience with formal, theoretical training in staff matters.”29 As the 
interwar period progressed, the former became more prominent as war experi-
ence among junior officers gradually decreased. 
Recent scholarship has been highly critical of the British Army’s process of 
nomination to the Staff College with Edward Smalley arguing that “the initially 
sound use of nominations to utilize Great War talent reduced in value . . . until 
it reached the point of undermining the credibility of the Staff College.”30 In 
support of the process of nomination, statistics presented by the commandant 
of Camberley in the late 1920s, Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, demon-
strated that in the majority of cases, nominated officers were equal to those who 
had gained entry via the competitive examination. He showed that, in the class 
passing out of the Staff College in December 1927, “in the top half there were 
25 British Service officers of whom 14 were nominated and 11 entered by com-
petition. In the bottom half of 29 . . . 9 were nominated, 12 [entered] by com-
petition.”31 Consequently, not only were those officers nominated to a place as 
capable of performing as those gaining entry via competitive examination, the 
1927 figures suggest that nominated officers were actually outperforming those 
entering by competition. In large part, this can be attributed to the additional 
practical experience gained by those officers nominated, because although the 
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numbers of those who entered by competition in both groups was relatively 
even, the disparity between nominated candidates, 14:9, suggests that prior 
experience of staff responsibilities gave nominated students a boost during the 
various schemes and questions posed over the duration of the course. As a re-
sult, until 1927, the British Army had a system of entry to the Staff College that 
was broadly suited to the demands of the army in this period. The combination 
of competitive examination coupled with nomination theoretically ensured 
that a mix of academically capable officers and those with practical experience 
of staff duties gained access to the ranks of the army staff. Furthermore, the 
structure of the exam papers allowed the varied requirements of British service 
to be represented. Given the requirements for operational planning within the 
British Army, this combination seems to have been ideally suited for the task at 
hand, able to both plan for multiple eventualities while also retaining a practical 
sense of the limitations and requirements of the British Army.
In practice, however, this system of entry was open to significant abuse, 
which ultimately impacted the ability of the colleges to ensure they were ob-
taining the best candidates for the staff. As noted above, the interwar army had 
a noteworthy problem recruiting the most academically able candidates due 
to competition from the other Services, who did not suffer from the tarnished 
reputation of the army post-First World War. In addition, the ethos and atti-
tude of the officer corps mitigated against the academic study of their profession 
that the type of flexible planning set out in British doctrine required. Indeed, 
British officers of all Services clung to their amateur past, with a future marshal 
of the Royal Air Force writing, “There was something agreeably amateur about 
the Services, perhaps particularly about the Army, in those days.”32 This attitude 
was epitomized by the regimental system, which prioritized social stauts and 
“gentlemanly” pursuits. Indeed, “ ‘shop talk’ was strictly forbidden at meals; 
officers occupied themselves with discussions about racing, horses and other 
gentlemanly pursuits.”33 Recent scholarship has convincingly demonstrated 
that, while junior officers were required to undertake various assessments and 
training to progress in rank, study beyond the minimum required was not en-
couraged. Indeed, future Field Marshal Edmund Ironside, when he was a junior 
officer in India, recalled an occasion while hospitalized, when he was found 
with military textbooks on his bedside table by a senior officer. He was asked, 
“What the devil are you reading those for? You are a horse artilleryman; what 
more do you want?”34 In this context, where many officers had grown out of the 
habit of professional study, the challenge posed by the Staff College entrance 
examination, particularly in light of the increased competition for places, led 
many to look for shortcuts to success. 
For them, the solution to overcome the army’s lack of focus on continuing 
professional education was to pay to attend a “crammer,” who would, during 
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a relatively short period of a few months, attempt to impart all the necessary 
information an officer required to pass the Staff College competitive examina-
tion. However, even though this method undoubtedly helped many officers 
pass the examination, it did create significant problems, not just for the officers 
concerned but for the army as a whole. First, there was no guarantee of find-
ing a good quality crammer, for as a contemporary publication noted, “Some 
are—well, business men, shall we say? . . . who are fully aware that if a candi-
date fails . . . he may return a second or third time.”35 Thus, were an officer to 
engage a charlatan crammer, at best he would have to pay multiple times for the 
same instruction, and at worst he could develop a “feeling of discouragement 
and even discontent . . . [as] in spite of sometimes repeated efforts . . . failed to 
achieve [his] ambition to get to the Staff College.”36 Not only would the officer 
have been out of pocket, he would potentially have been discouraged from 
taking any further interest in continuing to learn beyond his regimental duties. 
Furthermore, for those who found an effective crammer who could help them 
pass the examination at the first attempt, although they had achieved their ini-
tial objective of obtaining a place at Staff College, their longer-term knowledge 
may not have received a boost. 
Indeed, in discussing the relative merits of cramming and personal study, 
A. R. Godwin-Austin noted, “He will probably benefit considerably by burrow-
ing for it, since knowledge diligently acquired remains longer in the memory.”37 
As a result, not all officers were able to continue the promise shown by their 
examination scores into their studies at the colleges. In an analysis of the 1925 
Junior Division, Major General Ironside noted that only “about 30% are ob-
viously fitted for further training.”38 Thus, not only did the system of vacancy 
allocation to the staff colleges fail to allow for one of the central tenents of Brit-
ish doctrine, namely flexibility of purpose, it encouraged a system of learning 
that did nothing to encourage junior officers to break away from long-estab-
lished traditions of amateurism and aversion to learning for learning’s sake. As 
will be seen below, opening up competitive vacancies—while not solving the 
army’s political and social difficulties with defining a role for itself within the 
wider sphere of imperial defense planning—would have, theoretically at least, 
improved the available staff. It would have done so by encouraging more aca-
demically capable men to apply, not just for Staff College, but to join the army 
as officers through the greater possibility of advancement within the more sci-
entific corps. Furthermore, it would have allowed the creation of a general staff 
more capable of undertaking operational planning of a scientific and flexible 
nature, through the incorporation of officers from all corps. 
Abolition of Prewar Quotas
Even though no justification was given for the abolition of the prewar quota 
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system in 1926, given the recruitment problems facing the army at this time, 
the reasons behind this decision should be clear. In addition, the open recogni-
tion by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) that certain officers put 
forward for the staff should not have been allowed essentially forced the alter-
ation of the system by the Army Council. Removing this system had the desired 
effect, as the 1926 intake saw a significant increase in the overall scores earned 
by those officers obtaining competitive vacancies. Under the prewar quota sys-
tem, the lowest successful mark was 5,473 out of a possible 10,100. In contrast, 
by removing the quota system, the lowest successful mark rose by between 147 
and 456 marks to a maximum of 5,929.39 Given that the difference between the 
lowest seven qualifying marks was less than 100, this is significant. By assuming 
that the difference in marks between candidates broadly followed that provided 
to the military members, under the prewar quota system, the lowest qualifier 
would have sat 18 places lower in the order of merit than under a system of 
open competition. With an average of 25 competitive vacancies on offer each 
year, it is clear that this scenario would have seen a significant decrease in the 
academic quality of those gaining competitive places. For the army as a whole, 
removing the quota and improving the academic quality of prospective staff  
officers had some key benefits. Chief among these for the army was that it 
helped move away from the idea that “what mattered were questions of breeding 
. . . not acquired skills or theorizing about the conduct of war.”40 Furthermore, 
by implementing open competition, the Army Council virtually removed the 
element of luck, whereby an officer who passed the examination well could be 
denied access due to the quota for his service arm being filled, while an officer 
from another arm who “had just scraped through all the papers is . . . eligible.”41 
This would have gone a long way to improve morale within an officer corps 
where, due to limited promotion prospects, Staff College represented the most 
secure route to continued progression within the army. Thus, the decision to 
make competitive entry to Staff College a meritocracy was crucial for a period 
when the majority of ambitious junior officers believed that “unless they can get 
a p.s.c. [passed staff course], their chances are nil.”42 
Although clearly of benefit to the army at a time when it was grappling 
with significant problems in the structure of its officer corps, the result of this 
change had a series of unintended and not necessarily negative consequences for 
the army and its staff, namely a change in the balance of arms at Staff College. 
A decline in the number of infantry officers successfully obtaining competitive 
vacancies, coupled with an increase in the number of Royal Engineer officers 
applying for the Staff College would have resulted—had it continued—in the 
Staff College intake being dominated by officers of the Royal Engineers by 
1930, followed closely by the Royal Artillery.43 Indeed, an analysis of the dis-
tribution of officers taking the entrance examination showed that in 1930, of 
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the top 40 candidates, 13 came from the Royal Engineers, 10 from the Royal 
Artillery, 8 from the Indian Army, only 5 from British infantry units, and none 
from British cavalry units.44 This represented a significant shift from 1926, the 
last year of the prewar quota, when 16 came from British infantry, 10 from the 
Royal Artillery, 6 from the Royal Engineers, 4 from the Indian Army, and 1 
from British cavalry.45 As a result, the abolition of the prewar quota system and 
the subsequent increase in the number of officers from the technical corps had 
the potential to create an army staff that mirrored the changed face of a modern 
Euopean battlefield, with its increased emphasis on field fortifications, artillery, 
and additional logistical and supply requirements. 
Furthermore, figures presented to the CIGS demonstrated that not only 
were these officers applying for Staff College in greater numbers, but their mili-
tary knowledge was equal to that of their colleagues in the infantry and cavalry. 
The director of staff duties, Major General Cameron, compared the results of 
infantry, cavalry, Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineer officers taking the 1926 
Staff College entrance examination. He found that officers from the technical 
arms achieved better average marks in the examination than the infantry and 
cavalry officers (6,083.25 compared to 5,855.75).46 As demonstrated above, the 
200-mark difference this entailed would have represented a significant differ-
ence in placing an officer in the order of merit and therefore in the theoretical 
academic quality of the officer attending the Staff College. In addition, it was 
demonstrated that in the four Training for War examination papers, seen as 
the litmus test for potential staff officers, the technical corps achieved broadly 
comparable scores (2,321.7 compared to 2,374.25).47 As a result, it is clear that 
even though these officers may have had less practical experience of regimental 
duties and the handling of troops in the field, their theoretical knowledge was 
as sound as those officers for whom handling troops in combat was their regi-
mental role. As has already been shown, the majority of British commitments 
did not require field level staffs beyond those at headquarters level. The main 
concentration of staff officers was at the War Office in a variety of planning and 
organizational roles, where theoretical planning knowledge, rather than prac-
tical operational leadership, was required. Furthermore, from a temperament 
perspective, officers from technical arms, with their more academic and tech-
nical training, were ideally suited to the type of staff work generally required 
of junior staff officers. Field Service Regulations stated that staff officers’ duties 
involved assisting “their commander in the execution of the duties entrusted to 
him, to transmit his orders and instructions to subordinate commanders and 
to the services, to make the necessary arrangements in connection therewith.”48 
Given the nature of the training received by officers in the technical arms, it is 
evident that these officers were more suited to the duties described above than 
those of the more aggressive, action-oriented infantry and cavalry.
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This technical training was largely gained after officers had completed their 
initial officer training at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Engineering 
officers were then sent for a two-year mechanical science course at Cambridge 
University followed by courses at the School of Military Engineering.49 In a 
similar manner, officers from the Royal Artillery attended a course at the School 
of Artillery at Larkhill, where they learned the technical and scientific skills 
required of their role as well as how to cooperate with infantry in the field.50 In 
contrast, officers from the infantry and cavalry undertook a two-year course at 
Royal Military College, Sandhurst, followed by a nine-month period of training 
at a regimental depot, where they were taught the history of their new regiment, 
the interior economy of an infantry company, and relearned the drill they had 
already been taught at Sandhurst.51 Thus, officers from the technical arms re-
ceived significant post-commissioning training in academic subjects via univer-
sity, skills easily transferable to the heavily administrative functions of the staff, 
and the teeth arms received training that was far more practical and focused on 
action, leadership, and tactical training. Furthermore, while the training pro-
vided to technical officers could guarantee a standard level and quality of edu-
cation, the same could not be said for that given to infantry and cavalry officers.
A significant problem within the British Army was its ability to provide 
uniform, effective tactical training for its officers that was carried out within 
individual units.52 This left the British Army at the mercy of its regimental com-
mander’s attitudes toward training. “Some, like Wavell, Hobart and Burnett- 
Stuart, were enthusiastic trainers. . . . Other senior officers adopted a laissez-faire 
attitude towards training. . . . Some had so little imagination that they failed to 
recognize the need to explain to their subordinates the lessons which a particu-
lar exercise was intended to highlight.”53 This was to be a problem with broader 
consequences for the British Army’s ability to conduct operations in the open-
ing battles of the Second World War, particularly in the ability of formations 
that had not previously served or trained together to cooperate seamlessly on 
the battlefield.54 However, when it came to its impact on staff training, it is clear 
that the more critically minded, uniformly trained technical officers were bet-
ter suited to the role of coordinator and planner than the variable professional 
training of the infantry and cavalry officer. Similarly, the roles undertaken with-
in their regiments gave further support to the positive nature of this increase 
in technical officers obtaining Staff College vacancies. Wartime developments, 
particularly within the artillery but equally so the Royal Engineers, had resulted 
in a more scientific approach to warfare for these arms that fitted them for staff 
service. For the Royal Artillery, the development of flash spotting for counter-
battery fire, preplanned creeping barrages, and the use of battery boards and 
map firing all developed this arm’s knowledge and experience of preoperational 
planning, advanced supply collection and coordination, and the issuing of com-
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plex operational orders at regimental level.55 In contrast, infantry and cavalry 
officers’ roles were dominated by the character traits deemed to make them 
effective leaders of men rather than able administrators. 
Challenging the Social Status Quo
This shift in the makeup of the Staff College intake proved a significant stum-
bling block for a number of senior officers and resulted in a change of policy 
for the allocation of Staff College vacancies, which reflected not only the in-
stitutional prejudices of the regimental system but also reflected a significant 
problem within the British Army. This latter problem was an ingrained lack 
of understanding or agreement over the purpose of British Army staff colleges. 
Both of these issues had been present within the British Army long before this 
discussion about the allocation of vacancies took place and represented signifi-
cant stumbling blocks not just for Staff College in this period but for the army 
in general. The problems engendered by the regimental system of the British 
Army had existed long before it was formalized by Edward Cardwell and Hugh 
Childers in the 1860s and 1870s. The reforms of Cardwell aimed at improving 
the reputation of the army within society and encouraging the recruitment of “a 
better class of recruit and reduce losses from desertion by doing away with the 
prospect that soldiers could expect to spend most of their adult lives in colonial 
exile.”56 In addition, it sought to improve professionalism within the officer 
corps, along the lines of the Prussian system and to “control the over-regulation 
payments for commissions . . . by ending purchase entirely.”57 Although not an 
overt attempt to break the hold of the traditional officer class over the army, 
there were many within the institution who believed that the abolition of pur-
chase would create more of a meritocracy within the officer corps.58 
Ultimately, the reforms were more an attempt to professionalize the army 
after its disastrous performance in the Crimean War, and any idea that a true 
meritocracy would develop within the officer corps was effectively snuffed out 
by the reforms proposed by Childers a decade after those of Cardwell. The cre-
ation of localized regiments by Childers aimed at much the same ideal as those 
of Cardwell in that it desired improved professionalism within the army, while 
the introduction of compulsory retirement ages and promotion via regimen-
tal lists aimed to streamline the promotion process for regimental officers and 
remove those unfit for further promotion through a system of qualifying ex-
aminations.59 Within these reforms developed a system of regimental hierarchy 
that became so embedded in the psyche of the British military that the civilian 
permanent under secretary of the War Office felt secure in stating that “it is 
a principle established from the very inception of the army, that fighting corps 
. . . have the precedence of all other corps.”60 Even though a distinct hierarchical 
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structure existed within the fighting corps, it was the distinction between the 
fighting corps and the military tail that was to cause significant problems for the 
reform of Staff College during this period. 
This was largely a reflection of the generally conservative social structure 
of Britain at the time, particularly those sections of society that had historically 
provided the officer corps for the army. Indeed, Kier has argued, “While ‘social 
suitability’ was an important criterion for the prestigious infantry and cavalry 
regiments, the technical branches ranked candidates according to professional 
standards.”61 This departure from the gentleman amateur created similar feel-
ings within the officer corps as that experienced within the Royal Navy on 
the introduction of engineer officers and created hostility toward the idea of a 
“garage mechanic’s war.”62 This idea was most clearly set out in the discussion 
on vacancies at Staff College by Major General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, in 
which he stated, “As a general rule the R.E. officer inspires less confidence in 
commanders and troops.”63 As a result, according to those officers who thought 
like Bonham-Carter, though they may have manifested the key attributes to be 
a good staff officer, they did not have the aura of leadership required to be an 
effective commander. Following on from this comment, Bonham-Carter noted 
that it would be “advisable to limit the number of R.E. officers who can enter 
the Staff College without the check of nomination.”64 By requiring engineer 
officers to be nominated, Bonham-Carter was essentially proposing a character 
test to mitigate the supposed lack of command character among officers of this 
corps and ensure that those admitted possessed “stamina, courage, gallantry, 
character, and above all morale.”65 As a manifestation of the tradition of the gen-
tleman-officer, such a move provided senior officers with a pseudo- legitimate 
reason to deny officers from the technical corps a place at the college, ultimately 
being based on the Victorian ideals of the characteristics required of a good 
officer. Similarly, the adjutant general, Sir Walter P. Braithwaite, stated that he 
was “apprehensive of an overdose of R.E. officers at the Staff College and the 
resultant difficulty of placing such officers, when they become p.s.c. to the best 
advantage so far as the good of the Army is concerned.”66 Braitwaite does not 
elaborate on what “the good of the army” means, although his later comment, 
“that the number passing would embarrass you in the placing of them on the 
staff in the future,” perhaps provides some indication.67 As demonstrated above, 
technical officers displayed the same level of operational knowledge in the ex-
amination as those officers from the infantry and cavalry; indeed, the grow-
ing domination of competitive vacancies by officers from the Royal Engineers 
demonstrated that they frequently received higher marks than officers of those 
arms. Thus, it could not have been their academic standing that would have 
caused embarrassment to the CIGS, but their social standing. 
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Staff College or War College?
The second factor to create resistance to this change centered on a divergence of 
views surrounding the actual purpose of the Staff College within the interwar 
army. Principally, this was a debate waged between the postwar commandants 
of the Staff College and senior officers who had held roles in the prewar college. 
The former believed that “the Staff Colleges have their own special role, in the 
training of officers, in the duties of the staff in their respective services.”68 This 
view reflected the changed nature of modern warfare and was based on the 
experiences of the British Army during the First World War. For postwar com-
mandants, it was important to ensure that future staff officers and comman-
dants recognized the increased importance of prearranged fire plans, logistical 
support, and the rapid replacement of exhausted units with fresh formations, 
alongside having the practical knowledge required to ensure that such planning 
as was necessary took place. In contrast, those with experience of the prewar 
Staff College, particularly during the period when Sir Henry H. Wilson was in 
command (January 1907–July 1910), believed that it served “(a) To get into 
the way of concentrating on work. (b) To learn how to work and what to work 
to. (c) To learn how to read with understanding. . . . In fact the true value of a 
Staff College course is not so much to learn what you do learn . . . as to be put 
in the way of continuing your own education.”69 Wilson had believed firmly in 
the establishment of the Staff College as a school of thought with the result that 
one student during his tenure in command, future field marshal, Lieutenant 
Archibald P. Wavell, was moved to note that teaching was “too academic and 
theoretical and aimed too high. Its main object should surely have been to turn 
out good staff officers.”70 Therefore, even at the time, these attitudes were the 
subject of controversy. 
Much like the issues surrounding the social status of technical officers, 
this subject had its roots in traditional problems within the institution of the 
British Army. Unlike many Euopean armies, the British Army was very slow 
to come around to the concept of a general staff. Indeed, in 1870, German 
General Bronsart von Schellendorff was “astonished to find the duties of the 
Prussian Great General Staff performed in Britain by twelve general staff of-
ficers.”71 Along with the Cardwell and Childers reforms, the creation of a staff 
college at Camberley in 1858 came about as a result of British Army perfor-
mance in Crimea.72 Taking place prior to the establishment of the general staff 
in 1904, its initial purpose was never truly established; however, during the 
years leading up to the First World War, it established itself as “the only school 
of strategy, of organization, of Imperial Defence, in the Queen’s dominions.”73 
This was an idea firmly established by Sir Henry Wilson to the extent that im-
mediately prior to the First World War, the commandant, Lieutenant General 
Sir Launcelot Kiggell, commented that “it would be a good idea to change its 
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name to ‘War School’.”74 However, it must be remembered, these developments 
had taken place at a time when the army had not experienced a European-scale 
war since Crimea and had little understanding of how the logistical demands of 
this type of war had changed. Furthermore, the conditions that had manifested 
during the First World War, although not necessarily revolutionary in type, 
were certainly on a scale far beyond the experiences of the nations involved.75 As 
a result, the staff colleges were the only establishments available to train higher 
commanders and thus became the de facto route to high command until the 
opening of the Senior Officers’ School in 1916 and the Imperial Defence Col-
lege in 1927.76 Hence, while many in the army saw the training provided at the 
staff colleges as the best preparation for future commanders, many shared the 
attitude displayed both in the 1880s and during the course of the 1920s debates 
around the allotment of vacancies to Staff College that “the man who is likely 
to become the best Staff Officer is one who has obtained ample, practical expe-
rience in the handling of troops.”77 That Staff College was seen as the breeding 
ground for British commanders by senior officers during the 1920s is evident 
from the fact that the CIGS, Sir George Milne, filled 74 percent of senior 
posts with Staff College graduates. This attitude continued beyond Milne’s term 
of command to the extent that under Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery- 
Massingberd (1933–36), 100 percent of senior appointments were held by Staff 
College graduates.78 It is clear that for many senior officers, Staff College was a 
place to teach officers the art of learning and the knowledge they would need 
to be successful commanders rather than the practical skills required of a staff 
officer.
At the time these views were developed, this understanding was broadly 
correct; however, the conditions prevailing in the First World War had com-
pletely changed the landscape of war for the British Army and for its system of 
staff work and training. The rapid proliferation of staff schools during the First 
World War clearly demonstrated a need for the rapid training of staff officers, 
not only to make good losses but also to cope with the vastly increased logistical 
demands.79 Alongside this, the development of a worldwide informal network 
of learning within the British Army, largely facilitated by staff officers, suggested 
that the system of training was no longer fit for the purposes of modern war.80 
Furthermore, this focus on the training of commanders resulted in the staff 
becoming “infantry to excess.”81 Ultimately, as warfare was no longer a matter 
of infantry fighting it out until one side was too exhausted to continue, this 
overfocus on command was outdated. With the change in makeup of Staff 
College courses reflecting the dominant arms of the interwar period, it, like the 
army as a whole, was clearly entering a period of transition. However, similar to 
the debates surrounding the development and use of armored forces and their 
consequent morale-lowering impact on the traditional arms, when it came to 
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the shifting of the allocation of Staff College vacancies, there was resistance 
from senior officers.
The Response and Its Impact
Despite the clear positive impact of the system of open competition on the 
academic quality of officers entering Staff College and its change in compos-
tion more closely representing the increasingly technical nature of operations, a 
meeting of the military members of the council decided “that the allotment of 
vacancies at the Staff College to officers of technical corps, in which they include 
the R.E. [Royal Engineers], R.C. [Royal Corps] of Signals and the R.A.S.C. 
[Royal Army Service Corps], should be limited in number.”82 As demonstrated 
above, this change did not reflect the academic abilities of technical officers, or 
their importance to the army in future conflicts. Instead, it reflected a social 
hierarchy that owed as much to the Victorian army as it did to the backgrounds 
of those of a heavily class-conscious, postwar society that continued to view the 
army as a refuge for a certain strata of public school–educated man. Indeed, 
the quotas set out by the director of staff duties demonstrates exactly how far 
traditional attitudes and beliefs were represented. Figures for 1930 show that 
the infantry were allocated 16 competitive vacancies to the Royal Engineer’s 4.83 
This new quota system was to run alongside the continued use of nominations 
in the proportion of 80 percent competitive to 20 percent nominated. 
Given that this examination had been undertaken to improve the quality 
of officer attending the staff colleges, it was added that “no British Army officer 
will, however, be eligible to fill a competitive vacancy unless he is within the 
first 45 in order of merit.”84 However, this pass requirement could not be met 
by some arms, with the result that the infantry failed to fill its full allocation of 
competitive vacancies requiring 5 of the 16 available infantry vacancies to be 
filled by nomination.85 Thus, to find infantry officers who would be eligible for 
nomination, the nominating committee had to look outside the top 50 candi-
dates. Even though it has already been demonstrated that those officers entering 
the staff colleges via nomination were of comparable quality with those entering 
via competition, this return to the pre-1926 quality of candidate did not rep-
resent the expected improvement in the quality of officer. In addition, as the 
interwar period progressed, the much-desired wartime experience would have 
diminished, with the result that “the quality of nominated candidates declined 
. . . and, by 1930, most nominated officers had never seen combat; selection 
was instead based on subjective assessment of routine duties.”86 Thus, it would 
have become virtually impossible for the committee to ensure that a nominated 
officer had the necessary character qualities to appoint based on the flawed un-
derstanding that the staff colleges existed to mold and train future commanders. 
However, based on the factors cited above, it is easy to see why those officers, 
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with their ingrained regimental attitudes and prewar belief in the role of the 
Staff College, reacted as they did. Had the vacancies been filled through open 
competition, thus giving competitive vacancies to the first 33 officers on the 
examination order of merit, the Royal Engineers would have amassed 18 vacan-
cies to the infantry’s 6.87 
Theoretically, this new quota system could have benefitted the army. By ex-
amining the staff lessons of the First World War, the Army Council could have 
quickly identified the more complex and technical nature of staff work in the 
postwar military and adjusted the quota to suit these needs. However, the issue 
of India, along with those discussed above, served to further nullify the British 
Army Council’s ability to see this. The system of linked battalions, established 
as part of the 1860s Cardwell reforms, essentially ensured that a large num-
ber of infantry battalions were required to be maintained on the British Army 
strength to serve as reinforcement depots for the British/Indian establishment.88 
This, combined with the problem of needing to improve the attractiveness of 
the army as a career by ensuring the possibility of progression to senior rank, 
meant that any quota system adopted for the allocation of Staff College vacan-
cies had to be based on “regimental peace establishments.”89 Thus, with a greater 
number of infantry officers to satisfy as to their future progression, alongside 
the hierarchical, elitist attitude fostered by the regimental system, effectively 
negated any potential for positive change.
Conclusion
As can be seen, the reintroduction of a quota system for allocating competitive 
vacancies at the Staff College had a significant impact, not only on the quality 
of officers attending the colleges. By lowering the qualifying position in the 
order of merit and introducing a set limit on the number of officers from each 
arm, the British Army denied itself the opportunity to recruit the best officers 
for staff training and the ability to reshape its staff on the basis of its wartime 
experiences. Instead, by continually relying on regimental prejudice and Victo-
rian notions of the qualities required to be a good regimental officer and com-
mander, the British Army chose to ignore the lessons of industrial warfare and 
the attitudes of society toward the army and focus only on those skills seen as 
traditionally beneficial. Doing so not only disregarded the increased importance 
of the logistical tail of the army and the requirement for extensive operation-
al planning and interarm cooperation developed during the First World War 
but also had ensured the continued alienation of educated potential candidates 
for commissions. Given that the British Army was overstretched during the 
interwar years and struggled to recruit officers in adequate numbers or of the 
required quality, such a policy represents a significant failure to adequately uti-
lize its available resources. Had the system of open competition been allowed to 
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stand, the British Army would have rapidly acquired a staff that better reflected 
the planning requirements of modern war and also served as a vehicle to dismiss 
the idea that bright young men could not make a career in the army. With the 
rapid proliferation of threats from Germany, Italy, and Japan, combined with 
the continued fear of Russian involvement in India and other colonial actions, 
a more controlled and considered approach to operational planning was vital. 
Consequently, by returning to a system of vacancy allocation similar to that 
which had existed prior to the First World War, the Army Council condemned 
the British Army to repeat the mistakes of the early twentieth century and to 
focus on training future commanders, rather than officers capable of the type of 
logistical and operational planning that was to become the hallmark of warfare 
in the twentieth century.
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